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 The next generation passive optical networks (NG-GPON) such as long 
reach GPON is the future-proof solution to answer the continuous demands 
for access user bandwidth and network expansion. However, security which 
is yet to be addressed in NG-GPON needs urgent attention as it will become 
more critical due to much longer distance, denser user population and more 
network elements. In addition, the longer propagation delay in NG-GPON 
can also lead to a more complex bandwidth allocation mechanism that is 
expected to operate in a dynamic manner. Among the highlights of 
recommendations for future implementation are improvements in the security 
aspect and the use of dynamic bandwidth allocation (DBA) algorithm that 
suit the characteristics of long reach GPON. Current PON is exposed to 
degradation attack, a security breach that can harm how bandwidth fairness 
mechanism among ONUs work. Thus, this project proposes a secured DBA 
mechanism for NG-PON that could overcome this particular threat. 
In specific, a detection phase will be included in the DBA mechanism to 
sense and subsequently mitigate abnormal behaviours among ONUs that are 
harmful to the goal of DBA i.e. to ensure QoS among ONUs and traffics. 
At the same time, careful attention is given on the delay parameter as it is a 
critical parameter that can affect DBA performance in long reach GPON. 
In this paper, preliminary analysis is shown that reveal how possibility of 
threats increase with increasing of distance and network elements. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Future evolving PON involves longer fiber distance and more network elements especially ONUs to 
cater the demands for increasing number of users and bandwidth hungry applications. Increasing fiber 
distance can incur longer propagation delay which can significantly affect performance of the existing 
bandwidth allocation algorithm that is designed for conventional PON reach [1-2]. Even though a number of 
new DBAs have been proposed in the literature, to our knowledge, these algorithms lack security  
awareness [3].  
Since the launch of ITU-T G.989.1, in 2013, the GPON have growth exponentianally to cater for the 
demand of high bandwidth, high speed data communication. It usually consists of OLT (Optical Line 
Terminal), ONUs/ONTs (Optical Network Units or Optical Network Terminals) and ODN (Optical 
Distribution Network). OLT that is located at the central office or provider’s side of the access network is in 
control of the configuration and setup for all parameters e.g. frame duration and power level. The end unit 
(ONU) located at the customer’s side provides the conversion from optical to electrical signal and the 
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conversion from GPON Transmission Convergence (GTC) frames to Ethernet frames. Generally, Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs) with OLT do not need to have access to subscriber networks called the last mile. 
Hence, the subscribers (users) use only ONUs and ISP manages only Optical Line Termination (OLT) nodes. 
The distribution network employs one or more passive optical splitters (POS) to broadcast information to  
all ONUs. 
Different types of PON differ in how the resources are shared among ONUs. In a TDM-PON, 
bandwidth resource per fiber is shared on a time-division basis among ONUs. Traffic in the downstream 
direction is broadcasted by the OLT to all ONUs, with each ONU extracts traffic destined for itself. 
Meanwhile in the upstream transmission, each ONU is allocated specific time slots to transmit data to the 
OLT. The time slots can occur at irregular intervals and can have irregular durations. On the other hand, in a 
wavelength division multiplexed PON (WDM-PON), each ONU is allocated a different wavelength channel 
for communication between the OLT and that ONU. The most widely deployed PON technologies based on 
TDM-PON are Ethernet PON (EPON) and Gigabit PON (GPON). These technologies differ significantly in 
signaling rates, data formats and protocols employed [4-5]. 
As more end users are supported over a shared physical medium in future optical networks, access 
network security should be a greater importance as a single attack can affect a great number of users that may 
involve nearly hundreds of Gbps transmission [6]. GPON does offer security features such as data 
encryption, authentication and key establishment. However, since GPON has strong reliance on the 
assumption that all the GPON elements will be physically protected, its security mechanism is largely 
relaxed. Both authentication of ONUs and encryption of downstream traffic are optional while upstream 
traffic is not encrypted assuming high directionality of PON where other ONUs cannot sniff traffic sent by an 
ONU to OLT. 
Security is a ticking time bomb issue in the existing GPON that does not have a robust security 
measures as it relies on the assumption that all the GPON elements are physically protected. The fact that all 
ONUs can listen to data sent to other ONUs apart from their own is a potential threat that requires encryption 
and authentication to take place [7]. However, in the current GPON implementation, authentication and 
encryption are optional where encryption is only for the downstream communication from OLT to ONU 
using merely a plain text key that is exchanged earlier during initialization. Meanwhile, upstream 
communication from ONU to OLT are not encrypted assuming high directionality that makes  
sniffing difficult.  
These flaws lead to the call for stronger security measures in future PON. It is even more critical for 
long reach PON as the involvement of more GPON elements increase possibility of threats and the large 
number of users that can be affected [8]. In response, researches have proposed a number of encryption and 
authentication techniques for future PON [9-10]. However, as mentioned before, DBA mechanism which is 
an essential process in GPON lacks security awareness. In DBA process, attack by a malicious ONU takes 
place not to sabotage the whole GPON operation but instead to gain more bandwidth at the expense of other 
ONUs. The attacker basically exploits two features by sending GPON upstream signals out of its given slots 
and cause other ONUs to experience packet loss; (1) The TCP mechanism that reduces an ONU’s requested 
bandwidth in response to packet loss and (2) DBA’s bandwidth assignation that is done dynamically in 
accordance to ONU’s requested bandwidth. 
In research report by [11], cyber-attack incidents have increased on the recent years. However due 
to multilayer operation and standards, there is no clear-cut understanding of the attacks. This includes the 
source, the organization or complexity of the attack, and means to stop and counter the attacks.  There are 
numbers of typical attack within the PON system. For example, the Denial of Service, (DoS) attack, spoofing 
attack, eavesdropping and degradation attack [12]. Generally, botnet or bot launched the attack in the 
network [13-14], however locating the bots is proven a great difficult as proven by [15] as they can change 
rapidly and sporadically. This further complicated by the fact the attack can be launched from multiple 
puppets controlled by a single master bot and these puppets are unaware that they are being used as puppets. 
Complication further arises because there is no way for certain to predict when this attack happened and their 
magnitude of destruction. In 2016, an attack using Mirai Botnet successfully knockdown an entire county 
internet connection. To make matter worst, the attack in such magnitude is launched offline [16]. Even if the 
attack is launched on small country such as Liberia (only 10 percent of the people have access to internet), 
the hypothesis is that the attacker is testing the capabilities of the bot. Once the attack is perfected, it might be 
countries or entire continent hence, the damages will be unthinkable. 
However, when the attack is becoming more frequent, a trend can be mapped from them. When a 
network is under attack, the bandwidth of the network increased rapidly [11]. There are number of ways to 
predict an attack of the network. Common way to detect DoS attack is signature detection and traffic 
anomaly detection [17]. A signature detection scans based on malformed packets and protocol; a common 
signature of DoS attack. A traffic anomaly detection scans deviation on the traffic against normal condition. 
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Which is why the second detection protocol is preferred because the increased-on bandwidth can demonstrate 
the degree of attack in the network. At its peak, Mirai Botnet was hammering the servers with 620 gigabits of 
garbage traffic every second [18]. 
 Bear in mind that the attack could happen in each layer of the network [19]. DoS attack for example 
are generally happened in network layer or application layer [11, 20]. In network layer, the attacker normally 
tries to exhaust the available bandwidth in the network. Shrinking the bandwidth of the network provider or 
the server to the point where total network would crush. Application layer attack would include attacking the 
processing capabilities of the server or router. Such attack would include flooding the server with 
unimportant or empty packets, so much so that the server would be too busy to handle meaningful packet 
[21]. In this paper we only focus on security improvements in the GPON infrastructure itself that potentially 
have low impact on the already assigned technology and standard. In specific, physical layer-based security 
measures using passive or active devices are left out in order not to increase operational or capital 
expenditures. Moreover, gap in the GPON security standard might lead to new definitions based on 
proprietary solutions [22]. 
Existing work that looks at this particular issue during bandwidth allocation algorithm is conducted 
on EPON standard which is inherently different from GPON, and it is also based on short PON reach. GPON 
has more complicated structure with many encapsulations with variable lengths of parts. Furthermore, static 
bandwidth allocation algorithm that is deployed in this work also does not adhere to the long reach GPON 
requirement of dynamic bandwidth allocation mechanism [1]. 
For the purpose of this paper, we will only consider the form of DoS attack known as degradation 
attack that happens in the network. The malicious ONU targets on stealing bandwidth from another ONUs by 
reducing their throughput [6]. In this case, this ONU is not fake and physically valid. This is done by sending 
signals out of their allocated time using other ONU’s timeslot which leads to collision. As a result, the 
affected ONU will experience frame loss and request lesser bandwidth. The attacker could easily exploit 
bandwidth sharing algorithm to gain an unfair amount of bandwidth as bandwidth allocation algorithm 
typically works on available capacity and request bandwidth. [6] proposed a technique to detect and thus 
improve fairness in the allocation algorithm. However, the work is conducted on EPON standard which is 
inherently different from GPON and is based on small PON infrastructure. GPON has more complicated 
structure with many encapsulations with variable lengths of parts. Furthermore, static bandwidth allocation 
algorithm that is deployed in this work also does not adhere to the GPON requirement of dynamic bandwidth 
allocation mechanism [2], [23]. All these gaps lead to the call for a security-aware DBA that can be applied 
effectively in the evolving optical access networks that are based on Long Reach Passive Optical Network  
(LR-PON) roadmap. 
 
 
2. RESEARCH METHOD 
The research starts with the modelling of the attack. To model the attack first target is determined. 
For this experiment, the bandwidth is the target; or to be specific to exploit the vulnerability of limited 
bandwidth assigned to the network. In order to do so, heavy TCP traffic (packets) of legitimate-like headers 
and random payload is sent towards victim. The result is massive traffic generated, leading in bandwidth 
saturation and degradation of server’s CPU consumption. To add to the effect, once the malicious ONUs 
launched the attack, lawfull ONUs will experience bandwidth reduction due to automatic assigned DBA  
in PON. 
A simulation is done in the OMNeT++ platform. Standard PON architecture is defined and 
simulated. A single OLT is connected to varied amount of ONUs. The number of ONUs differed from 8, 16, 
32, and 64. ITU-T compliant DBA considers type of traffic by categorizing it to four classes as in Table 1. A 
PON network has to support different broadband services like video conferencing, leased lines, and VoIP in 
addition to basic voice and data services, each with different delay and bandwidth requirements. ITU-T 
categorizes PON traffic in 4 classes type 1 (T1) to type 4 (T4) as shown in the Table 1. These traffic classes 
handle multiple traffic types by mapping to a suitable class. A traffic bearing entity is represented by a 
transmission container (TCONT), which carries the particular traffic class frames. Each TCONT has a unique 
identifier (Alloc‐ID) that is assigned by optical line terminal (OLT) in the ONU initialization phase. 
In the DS direction, the traffic pattern is broadcasted, but in the US case, the media is shared by all 
the optical network units (ONUs) in a time division multiplexed manner as the US transmission of all ONUs 
is on the same wavelength. Therefore, a bandwidth management scheme is necessary for efficient and fair 
distribution of US bandwidth. 
The simplest scheme could be a fixed bandwidth assignment (FBA) for all the ONUs. However, this 
scheme not only causes bandwidth wastage by ONUs, which have low traffic load, but it also results in 
increased delays for the heavily loaded ONUs as they do not get the desired bandwidth. If a dynamic 
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bandwidth assignment (DBA) scheme is used instead, then the available bandwidth can be efficiently used as 
it can assign bandwidth to all the ONUs fairly as per their demand and in compliance to the service level 
agreements (SLAs). The DBA scheme also allows the network operators to oversubscribe customers on the 
best effort (BE) basis to enhance the revenues The DBA scheme at OLT assigns bandwidth to each traffic 
class as per its demand and its SLA. 
 In order to distribute bandwidth fairly, scheduling mechanism for bandwidth allocation is done 
based on TCONT type. Each TCONT has a unique allocation ID (Alloc-ID) to identify different traffic types 
[24]. For this simulation, DS traffic load is fixed to 0.1 and US traffic load is fixed to 0.8 Since T-CONT type 
1 is allocated for static bandwidth, T1 is not considered in this paper. 
 
 
Table 1. TCONT reference model [24]  
TCONT Type of Bandwidth Description 
1 Fixed bandwidth VoIP, live video streaming 
2 Assured bandwidth Minimum guaranteed bandwidth 
3 Non-assured bandwidth From underloaded IDs 
4 Best effort bandwidth Lowest priority 
 
 
It is an improvement to [24] where it divides the remaining unassigned bandwidth equally to all 
ONUs and the bandwidth assignment for T2, T3 and T4 is 40%, 35% and 25% respectively. If there is still 
remaining bandwidth, it will be uniformly distributed among T4 classes. According to ITU, T4 cannot be 
given priority over T2 and T3 during service interval (SI), over allocates bandwidth to a traffic class only if 
total available byte counter for each traffic class of each ONU is positive [25]. 
For the first part of simulation, the network is run with all the ONUs obeying the predetermined 
timeslot allocated for them. The value of average mean delay is recorded for each experiment. Next, one 
ONU is set as malicious node that will run in 50% of all the bandwidth of the entire network. Hence leaving 
every other ONUs (the obedient ones) to share remaining 50% of the bandwidth. Again, the value of average 
mean delay is recorded. 
Figure 1 shows the simulation setup for the experiment. In each experiment, the number of ONUs is 
set to be varied from 8,16,32, and 64. This is to demonstrate the degree of damage to the network once the 
attack started. The server act as traffic generator using poison distribution which connected to OLT and then 
splitter. The splitter is connected to various nodes which in this case acted like the ONUs. For simplicity of 
simulation only one host and one user are configured per ONU. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Simulation setup for 16 ONUs [24] 
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3. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
We considered a network with maximum of 1 malicious node. The attack of the network will start 
after 2 second from the start of simulation time. When the attack starts, the poison distributed traffic will 
automatically take over 50% of the entire network throughput. Hence remaining ONUs will have to sustain 
with just 50% of bandwidth. The Figure 2, 3 and 4 shows the average delay of the packet arriving in 
upstream connection. The average upstream delay results for T2, T3 and T4 traffic are illustrated in Figure 4. 
ITU-T G.987.1 recommends that GPON system must accommodate services that require a maximum mean 
delay of 1.5ms [25].  
As general representation, the average delay increases when the number of ONU is increase 
regardless of traffic type. However, the percentage of difference on the delay between 64 ONU is much 
larger compared to small number of ONUs; for example, 8 ONUs. For 8 ONUs the difference in delay is 8% 
and 648 ONUs is 21%. Since the Dynamic Bandwidth Allocation is applied in the network, an unused 
bandwidth by the well behaved ONU will be further manipulated by the malicious ONU. Hence the increase 
in ONU numbers will also means the increase in unused bandwidth by the well behave ONUs. As the number 
of subscribers will only keep on increasing over the time, this is some serious complication to be solved in 
terms of optical network security 
In Figure 2, T2 traffic class shows the least delay as network load increases due to its highest 
priority. This proves that the algorithm satisfies ITU standard which T2 and T3 are supposed to be given 
priority bandwidth allocation and T4 has the least priority. As shown in Figure 4, T4 traffic class has the 
highest upstream delay and as the network being attack it will have the most significant delay at 64 ONUs 
compared to T2 and T3 traffic type. The increased of delay for T4 starts at network load 0.8 where it is 
already beyond XGPON requirement. This is expected because T4 is best effort type of bandwidth and given 
the lowest priority with 25% of bandwidth assignment. T2 and T3 have the average upstream delay less than 
ITU-T recommendation. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Comparison of T2 type traffic 
 
 
Figure 3. Comparison of T3 type traffic 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of T4 type traffic 
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In general, in normal DBA operation, the average delay performance is as expected: 
a. Delay increases when the number of ONU increases indicating more bandwidth competition. 
b. For all ONU range from 8 to 64, TCONT2 has the lowest delay, followed by TCONT3 and TCONT4 as 
DBA treats classes differently. 
c. Delay increment between min ONU, 8 and max ONU, 64; ~20% for TCONT2, ~24% for TCONT3 and 
~27% for TCONT4. 
In scenario where malicious ONU floods the network: 
a. Delay increases drastically as a result of disruption to service that reduces the available bandwidth that 
can be assigned to well-behaved ONUs. 
b. For all ONU range from 8 to 64, TCONT2 and TCONT3 have almost similar delay performance. 
c. Delay increment between min ONU, 8 and max ONU, 64; ~50% for TCONT2 and TCONT3, and ~65% 
for TCONT4. 
d. The best effort traffic is highly affected in the event of attack. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
We have studies the impact of malicious ONU that attack the network in terms of upstream delay. 
A dynamic bandwidth allocation implement in the network will further favour the malicious node as they 
continue to take up the unused bandwidth from lawful ONUs. As the number of ONUs increased, the effect 
of the attack become more severe. Here however, the attacker is limited to be one malicious whereby in real 
life the attack could be launched from various sources. Next plan of action is to further study the impact of 
attack in larger network and find out suitable punishment to the attacker without compromising the network 
bandwidth and other well-behaved ONUs. 
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